Computer underground Digest Sun Jul 23, 1995 Volume 7 : Issue 62 ISSN 1004-042X Editors: Jim Thomas and Gordon Meyer (TK0JUT2@MVS.CSO.NIU.EDU Archivist: Brendan Kehoe Shadow Master: Stanton McCandlish Field Agent Extraordinaire: David Smith Shadow-Archivists: Dan Carosone / Paul Southworth Ralph Sims / Jyrki Kuoppala Ian Dickinson CONTENTS, #7.62 (Sun, Jul 23, 1995) File 1--Cincinnati BBS Raids Indictment File 2--Kyl and Leahy to Introduce Anti-Hacker Bill File 3--Computer Porn Conviction: New Thought Control (fwd) File 4--"Computer Privacy Handbook" by Bacard File 5--Cu Digest Header Info (unchanged since 19 Apr, 1995) CuD ADMINISTRATIVE, EDITORIAL, AND SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION APPEARS IN THE CONCLUDING FILE AT THE END OF EACH ISSUE. --------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: Sat, 22 Jul 1995 09:23:01 PDT From: Paul J. Ste. Marie Subject: File 1--Cincinnati BBS Raids Indictment ((MODERATORS' NOTE: The Cincinnati BBS raids strike us a witch hunts. The following document gives us no reason to change our minds. The raids seem consistent with the current mood of some prosecutors, politicians, and others, to ride the "anti-porn" hysteria). 0024573 Plaintiff UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO WESTERN DIVISION BOB EMERSON d/b/a, Cincinnati Computer CASE NO. Connection, 4466 Dogwood Drive Batavia, Ohio 45103, Plaintiff, vs. SIMON L. LEIS, JR. Hamilton County Justice Center 1000 Sycamore Cincinnati, Ohio 45202 HAMILTON COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT COMPLAINT AND Hamilton County Justice Center JURY DEMAND 1000 Sycamore Cincinnati, Ohio 45202 HAMILTON COUNTY REGIONAL COMPUTER CRIMES TASK FORCE Hamilton County Justice Center 1000 Sycamore Cincinnati, Ohio 45202 UNION TOWNSHIP POLICE DEPARTMENT, A Division Of The Public Safety Department Of Union Township, Ohio 4312 Gleneste-Withamsville Road Cincinnati, Ohio 45245 CINCINNATI POLICE DEPARTMENT, A Division Of The Public Safety Department Of The City Of Cincinnati c/o Division 5 1012 Ludlow Avenue Cincinnati, Ohio 45202 MICHAEL BURNS 4312 Gleneste-Withamsville Road Cincinnati, Ohio 45245 MICHAEL SNOWDEN c/o Division 5 1012 Ludlow Avenue Cincinnati, Ohio 45202 DALE MENKAUS Hamilton County Justice Center 1000 Sycamore Cincinnati, Ohio 45202 DETECTIVE SWISSHELM Hamilton County Justice Center 1000 Sycamore Cincinnati, Ohio 45202 JANE/JOHN DOES Law Enforcement Officers Addresses Currently Unknown Defendants. Now comes plaintiff, Bob Emerson, d/b/a Cincinnati Computer Connection who for its complaint against defendants, states as follows PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 1. This is an action under the laws and Constitution of the United States alleging that state law enforcement officials from various jurisdictions in Southwest Ohio and Northern Ken tucky acting in concert as part of a "Regional Computer Crimes Task Force," unlawfully and unconstitutionally seized computer equipment, files, and communications in furtherance of a campaign to impose a prior restraint on the computer transmission of non- obscene adult oriented forms of expression presumptively protected by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. JURISDICTION 1. Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court by 18 U.S.C. 2707, 28 U.S.C. 1331, 28 U.S.C. 1343, 28 U.S.C. 2201, 28 U.S.C. 2202, 42 U.S.C. 1983, 42 U.S.C. 1985, 42 U.S.C 1988, and 42 U.S.C. 2000aa. 2. This is a suit authorized by law to redress deprivations under color of state law of rights, privileges, and immunities secured by the First, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, the First Amendment Privacy Protection Act, and Title II of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act. 3. Venue in this Court is appropriate as the various acts complained of occurred within the Western Division of the Southern District of Ohio. PARTIES 4. Plaintiff Bob Emerson, an individual who resides at 4466 Dogwood Drive, Batavia, Ohio 45103, owns and operates a for- profit electronic computer bulletin board system known as Cincinnati Computer Connection (hereinafter "CCC"). 5. Defendant, Simon L. Leis, Jr., is and was at all times referred to herein the Sheriff of Hamilton County, Ohio. He is sued in both his personal and official capacities. 6. Defendant, Hamilton County Sheriff's Department, is a sheriff's department organized under the laws of the State of Ohio. 7. Defendant, Hamilton County Regional Computer Crimes Task Force, is a branch of the Hamilton County Sheriff's Department organized under the laws of the State of Ohio to utilize special skills and expertise in investigating computer crimes. 8. Defendant, Union Township Police Department, is a division of the Public Safety Department of Union Township Ohio, organized under the laws of the State of Ohio. 9. Defendant, Cincinnati Police Department, is a division of the Public Safety Department of the City of Cincinnati, organized under the laws of the State of Ohio. 10. Defendant, Michael Burns, is and was at all times referred to herein the Acting Chief of the Union Township Police Department in Clermont County, Ohio. He is sued in both his personal and official capacities. 11. Defendant, Michael Snowden, is and was at all times referred to herein the Chief of the Cincinnati Police Department. He is sued in both his personal and official capacities. 12. Defendant, Dale Menkaus, is and was at all times referred to herein the Commander of the Regional Computer Crimes Task Force. He is sued in both his personal and official capacities. 13. Defendant, Detective Swisshelm, is and was at all times referred to herein a member of the Regional Computer Crimes Task Force. He is sued in both his personal and official capacities. 14. Jane/John Doe, are individuals from the Regional Computer Crimes Task Force and/or other police departments from various jurisdictions whose names are currently unknown whom plaintiff believes conspired with defendants and participated in the acts against plaintiff complained of herein. Such individuals are sued in both their personal and official capacities. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 15. A computer bulletin board system, like CCC, stores information in a central computer and allows subscribers to access that information via telephone lines and personal computer equipment. By means of a computer bulletin board, subscribers can converse, communicate and exchange various types of information with each other as well as retrieve information stored on the bulletin board itself. 16. Plaintiff has been operating CCC since 1982 and has developed a list of monthly subscribers numbering in the thousands, who pay a set fee for access to the bulletin board. CCC offers its subscribers the ability to send and receive electronic mail (hereinafter "e-mail"), to participate in on-line discussion groups, to utilize and download software, to engage in computer games, and to receive newspapers and periodicals of general as well as highly specialized interest. Included among the various information and service options offered to subscribers of CCC is non-obscene adult oriented material. This category of material represents approximately three (3) percent of the total informational material and resources offered by CCC to its subscribers. Access to the non-obscene adult oriented material on the CCC bulletin board is restricted to a limited number of adult subscribers who requested such access. 17. Commencing sometime prior to June 16, 1995, defendants, under color of state law and pursuant to and in their official capacities for and on behalf of their respective jurisdictions, conspired together and with others unknown, and therefore not named as defendants, to violate plaintiff's rights and privileges guaranteed to him by the First, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, the First Amendment Privacy Protection Act, and Title II of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act by designing and implementing a campaign characterized by harassment, express and implied threats of criminal prosecution, and mass seizures of computer equipment and information. This campaign was initiated by defendants for the purpose of causing plaintiff, and others, to cease transmitting and/or receiving non-obscene adult oriented material via computer technology. 18. Sometime on or about June 16, 1995, pursuant to and part of this campaign, defendants, under color of state law, sought a search warrant authorizing the search of all computer equipment and accessories necessary for the operation of CCC and authorizing the wholesale and indiscriminate review of all computer electronic communications transmitted to and from plaintiff and CCC's subscribers including, but not limited to, e- mail and personal correspondence that was stored in or exchanged in electronic form by means of CCC's equipment and software. At the time defendants made application for the aforementioned search warrant, defendants knew or should have known that no reasonable grounds existed to believe that the contents of the e- mail and personal correspondence sought were relevant or material to any on-going criminal investigation. 19. On June 16, 1995, pursuant to and part of this campaign, defendants, under color of state law, obtained and executed a search warrant providing for the search of plaintiff's personal residence for all computer equipment and accessories necessary for the operation of CCC as well as for all electronic communications transmitted to and from CCC's subscribers including, but not limited to, e-mail and personal correspondence that was stored in or exchanged in electronic form by means of CCC's equipment and software. 20. As a further part of this campaign, following the execution of the aforementioned search warrant, defendants seized and physically removed from plaintiff's residence virtually the entire inventory of computer equipment and accessories owned by plaintiff and necessary for the operation of CCC. Included among the numerous equipment and accessories seized by defendants were computer hardware, video display units, printers, software, data drives, and internal or external information storage units. As a consequence of defendants' actions in removing the aforementioned computer equipment and accessories, defendants necessarily seized information transmitted to and from CCC and its subscribers, including, but not limited to, e-mail and correspondence stored or exchanged in electronic form. As a further consequence of these actions defendants seized plaintiff's entire inventory of non-obscene adult related material as well as all other forms of expressive material. 21. At the time defendants sought, obtained, and executed the aforementioned search warrant and seized all of the computer equipment and accessories related to the operation of CCC, as well as much of the information provided by CCC to its subscribers which was contained in such equipment, defendants knew or should have known i. that items seized included work product and documentary material containing mental impressions, conclusions or theories of individuals who authored or created such materials for the purpose of disseminating same to the public; ii. that the information seized included e-mail and personal correspondence transmitted to and from plaintiff and CCC's subscribers; iii. that the information seized included expressive material protected under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution that cannot be seized without a prior judicial determination of probable obscenity; iv. that the mass seizure of this computer equipment and information would have a devastating impact on the plaintiff's business; v. that the mass seizure of this computer equipment and information would prevent plaintiff from transmitting any information, including expressive material protected under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution; vi. that the search warrant under which authority defendants ostensibly based their actions did not by its terms authorize the seizure of any materials or information; vii. that there were less intrusive means of obtaining the information defendants sought to inspect for potential violations of state law, and that such means, if utilized, would have permitted plaintiff to continue to use and derive the economic benefit of his computer equipment; viii. that there were less intrusive means of obtaining the information defendants sought to inspect for potential violations of state law, and that such means, if utilized, would have permitted plaintiff to continue to receive and transmit constitutionally protected speech; ix. that there were less intrusive means of obtaining the information defendants sought to inspect for potential violations of state law, and that such means, if utilized, would have preserved the privacy interests of plaintiff and his subscribers in the e-mail and personal correspondence that was stored in or exchanged in electronic form via CCC's equipment and software; and x. that it was not necessary to physically seize and remove the information sought or any of the computer equipment owned by plaintiff because defendants at all times were capable of retrieving or "downloading" information exchanged or stored in plaintiff's computer equipment and by such means preserving said information for any legitimate law enforcement purpose determined by defendants. 22. Defendants' activities were conducted purposefully, in bad faith, in conscious and reckless disregard of plaintiff's federal and constitutional rights to privacy, to free speech, and to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, and with the intention to intimidate plaintiff from his continued exercise of free expression and to impose a prior restraint on the transmission of presumptively protected forms of expression by plaintiff and others by permanently removing from circulation non- obscene adult oriented and other forms of expression and by physically removing and retaining the computer equipment and software by which computer-generated forms of expression are transmitted. 23. As a direct and proximate result of defendants' actions, as previously described, plaintiff has suffered and will continue to suffer damage to his business and professional reputation in the following regards i. plaintiff has lost the use of computer equipment valued at approximately $45,000.00; ii. plaintiff has been forced to replace computer equipment at the cost of approximately $45,000.00; iii. plaintiff has lost revenue from subscribers in the amount of approximately $28,000.00 per month; iv. plaintiff has suffered a temporary and permanent loss of a portion of his subscriber base; v. plaintiff has lost good will associated with the operation of a legitimate and lawful computer service; and vi. plaintiff has been prevented from transmitting presumptively protected material to his subscribers. 24. Further, unless defendants are preliminarily and permanently enjoined from continuing to engage in a campaign to intimidate plaintiff, to chill the exercise of his constitutional rights, and to impose a prior restraint upon the distribution of presumptively protected forms of expression, plaintiff will continue to suffer violations of his constitutional rights, thereby incurring irreparable injury for which plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law. STATEMENT OF THE CLAIM COUNT ONE 25. Paragraphs one (1) through twenty-six (26) are realleged as if fully rewritten. 26. The actions of defendants, as described herein, deprived plaintiff of his right to free speech secured by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1983. COUNT TWO 27. Paragraphs one (1) through twenty-six (26) are realleged as if fully rewritten. 28. The actions of defendants, as described herein, deprived plaintiff of his right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures secured by the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1983. COUNT THREE 29. Paragraphs one (1) through twenty-six (26) are realleged as if fully rewritten. 30. The actions of defendants, as described herein, deprived plaintiff of his right to privacy secured by the United States Constitution in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1983. COUNT FOUR 31. Paragraphs one (1) through twenty-six (26) are realleged as if fully rewritten. 32. The actions of defendants, as described herein, deprived plaintiff of the right to be free from deprivations of property without due process of law as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1983. COUNT FIVE 33. Paragraphs one (1) through twenty-six (26) are realleged as if fully rewritten. 34. The actions of defendants, as described herein, deprived plaintiff of rights secured by the First Amendment Privacy Protection Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000aa. COUNT SIX 35. Paragraphs one (1) through twenty-six (26) are realleged as if fully rewritten. 36. The actions of defendants, as described herein, deprived plaintiff of rights secured by Title II of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. 2701. COUNT SEVEN 37. Paragraphs one (1) through twenty-six (26) are realleged as if fully rewritten. 38. The actions of defendants, as described herein, constituted an illegal conspiracy to deprive plaintiff of his constitutional rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1985(3). PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Bob Emerson, d/b/a/ Cincinnati Computer Connection, hereby demands judgment as follows _ 1. A declaration that the actions of the defendants constitute a prior restraint in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution; 1. A preliminary and permanent injunction restraining, enjoining and prohibiting the defendants from undertaking, enforcing, maintaining, or adopting any policies, procedures, practices, campaigns, or acts against or towards plaintiff which constitute a prior restraint upon plaintiff's transmission of protected forms of expressive non-obscene adult oriented materials; 2. An order requiring defendants to return to plaintiff all computer equipment, accessories and material seized from plaintiff; 3. An order awarding plaintiff compensatory damages for his economic injuries in an amount not less than $250,000.00; 4. Liquidated damages under 42 U.S.C. 2000aa; 5. An award of plaintiff's reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred herein pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1988; and 6. An award of such other relief in law and equity that this Court deems just and proper in the premises. JURY DEMAND Plaintiff demands the within facts be tried to a jury. Respectfully submitted, SIRKIN, PINALES, MEZIBOV & SCHWARTZ H. LOUIS SIRKIN Ohio Bar No. 0024573 MARC D. MEZIBOV Ohio Bar No. 0019316 LAURA A. ABRAMS Ohio Bar No. 0056183 920 Fourth & Race Tower 105 West Fourth Street Cincinnati, Ohio 45202 Telephone (513) 721-4876 Telecopier (513) 721-0876 Attorneys for Plaintiff ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 21 Jul 1995 09:38:59 -0400 (CDT) From: Bob Izenberg Subject: File 2--Kyl and Leahy to Introduce Anti-Hacker Bill This came from volume 15 issue 311 of TELECOM Digest: Date--Thu, 20 Jul 95 07:52:59 MST From--John Shaver Forwarded to TELECOM Digest, FYI. From--info@kyl.senate.gov at WOODY Date--7/11/95 1:41PM FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE CONTACT: Liz Hickey Wednesday, June 21, 1995 (202) 224-4521 KYL AND LEAHY TO INTRODUCE ANTI-HACKER BILL (Washington, D.C.) -- Senator Jon Kyl (R-AZ) and Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT) will introduce a bill next week that responds to the rapidly increasing sophistication of computer crime by criminalizing and toughening penalties for a host of computer security violations. The bill makes it a felony for a hacker to inflict reckless damage on a computer system. It also makes it a felony for an authorized user to inflict intentional damage on a computer system. And it criminalizes cases where individuals threaten to crash a computer system unless access and an account are granted. "Our national infrastructure, the information that bonds all Americans, is not adequately protected," Kyl said. "This bill will make criminals think twice before illegally gaining access to computer files. "We have a national anti-stalking law to protect citizens from harrassment, but it doesn't cover the equivalent of stalking on the communications network. We should not treat these criminals differently simply because they injure us in other ways." Reports demonstrate that computer crime is on the rise. The Computer Emergency and Response Team (CERT) at Carnegie-Mellon University found computer intrusions have increased from 132 in 1989 to 2,341 in 1994. A report commissioned last year by the Department of Defense and the CIA states "[a]ttacks against information systems are becoming more aggressive, not only seeking access to confidential information, but also stealing and degrading service and destroying data." Current law punishes only those who trespass AND adversely affect the use of a government computer. The bill treats viewing information, even when no theft or damage occurs, as a criminal offense. In this situation, privacy and security have been breached. "The system administrator in these cases must spend time, money, and resources to restore security," Kyl said. "We can no longer accept trespassing into computers and viewing information as incidental just because the information isn't stolen or damaged." The "Kyl/Leahy National Information Infrastructure Protection Act of 1995" adds a statute to allow prosecutors to fight interstate and foreign transportation of stolen computer files. And it ensures that repeat computer crime offenders are subject to harsher penalties. ------------------------------ Date: Sat, 22 Jul 1995 21:49:28 -0500 (CDT) From: David Smith Subject: File 3--Computer Porn Conviction: New Thought Control (fwd) ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From--bc880@freenet.toronto.on.ca (Marcus Shields) Subject--Computer Porn Conviction--New Thought Control Internet users- particularly those in Canada- concerned about government attempts to "crack down on Internet perverts" should take careful note of the following article exerpted from the Toronto Star newspaper: COMPUTER PORN CONVICTION A FIRST A 20-year old Mississauga man will be sentenced July 20 for creating and distributing child pornography on a computer bulletin board. It is the first reported conviction under Canada's two-year-old kiddie porn law involving computer production and distribution. "The materials are pretty disgusting, _but_at_this_stage_they're_ _all_his_fantasy,_all_the_workings_of_his_perverted_mind", (emphasis added) assistant crown attorney Philip Enright said of Joseph Pecchiarich, 20. ..."What he would do is take his scanner and run the scan over a totally innocent picture of a child, say a 5-year old girl modelling a bathing suit," Enright explained. "Then, when it was transposed on to his screen, with the software that he had on his computer he was able to remove the clothing and add genitalia and then he would put the child in a sexually provocative position." So, there we have it, fellow Canadian computer users; merely harbouring thoughts of having sex with children is now an offense that will be zealously tracked down by the police and prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law. Now, the fascinating thing about the Pecchiarich case, in eerie similarity to the recent Eli Langer "obscene art" prosecution in Toronto, is that in both these cases of alleged "child pornography", there is one rather minor (pun intended) missing element. To wit, CHILDREN. If you will cast your mind back to the situation several years ago when the Mulroney government passed the "child pornography" law (over the bitter objections of the civil liberties lobby, and virtually without serious debate in Parliament, partly because it was near the end of the session but mainly because even the NDP had been cowed into silence by overwhelmingly conservative public opinion), the entire premise upon which this law was passed was, "to protect children from sexual abuse". But in both the Peccharich and Langer cases, no children- indeed, no living beings of any kind- were involved at any stage of the process. What these individuals WERE prosecuted for, is publicly expressing thoughts that conservative society abhors- to wit, child sexuality. Now, I'm strongly against the PRACTICE of children being involved in sexual conduct, too- but, if we accept the idea that merely communicating an idea that society doesn't like can be subject to criminal prosecution, where do we draw the line? Suppose Peccharich had used his computer to retouch a picture of Mila Mulroney so she appeared to be in bondage? What if he doctored a picture of Jean Chretien or Bill Clinton so it appeared that Bill or Jean had been assassinated? Why is it OK for society to punish someone for publishing thoughts of deviant sex, but not OK to punish someone for imaginary depictions of murder? (Time to pull _True_Lies_ from the video store, I guess.) Well, you might want to discuss this issue with your fellow Net users. As long as doing so is still legal in the eyes of the police. ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 28 Jun 1995 18:23:51 EST From: "Rob Slade, Social Convener to the Net" Subject: File 4--"Computer Privacy Handbook" by Bacard BKCMPRHB.RVW 950418 %A Andre Bacard abacard@well.com %C 2414 6th St., Berkeley, CA 94710 %D 1995 %G 1-56609-171-3 %I Peachpit Press %O U$24.95/C$31.95 510-548-4393 fax: 510-548-5991 800-283-9444 %O trish@peachpit.com gary@peachpit.com %P 274 %T "Computer Privacy Handbook" "Computer Privacy Handbook", Andre Bacard, 1995, 1-56609-171-3, U$24.95/C$31.95 After the three prior works on PGP and related issues, Bacard's book reads like a popular magazine article. Unfortunately, this is not necessarily an advantage. Part (chapter?) one is a general overview of privacy as related to computers. The examples and arguments used, though, are chosen from such a broad spectrum that they actually weaken the position in favour of privacy and confidentiality. Most of the anecdotes relayed in the book have little to do with computers. The majority have to do with governmental or corporate activities over which the individual has no say. None bear on the function of PGP (Pretty Good Privacy) -- to encrypt local files and, in particular, those sent over public email channels. Chapter two discusses encryption in general terms. *Very* general terms. There is no attempt to grasp or present any technical material here. This prevents Bacard from noting the silliness of statements that "high-quality crypto" is "impossible" to break, or that methods of attack have not been publicly identified. First, this sounds suspiciously like "security by obscurity". Second, an awful lot of people *do* know how to break PGP -- and they know exactly how long it will take. (By the way, it was Ken Follett, not the Germans, who used "Rebecca" as a code key.) The discussion of ITAR (the International Traffic in Arms Regulation of the US government) does not provide enough detail to explain the difficulties Phil Zimmermann faces, nor the problems in getting PGP overseas. The coverage of Clipper, however, is excellent. The overview of PGP given in chapter three is a fair enough description, but completely avoids touching on Zimmermann's difficulties with the US federal government or RSA Data Security. The pointers on how to get PGP are useless unless you want to buy ViaCrypt's version. The US sites all have limitations, and usually some form of authentication before you can access the files. The international versions are illegal in the US because of patent issues. Chapter four is documentation for the commercial version of PGP. While the Stallings (cf. BKPRTPRV.RVW), Garfinkel (cf. BKPGPGAR.RVW) and Schneier (cf. BKEMLSEC.RVW) works are written by technical experts and contain technical background, they are not impossible for the layman to understand. This work, therefore, fails in a number of respects, and brings little to the subject which has not been said before. copyright Robert M. Slade, 1995 BKCMPRHB.RVW 950418 ====================== ROBERTS@decus.ca, RSlade@sfu.ca, Rob Slade at 1:153/733 RSlade@cyberstore.ca The Internet interprets censorship as damage and routes around it - J. Gilmore Author "Robert Slade's Guide to Computer Viruses" 0-387-94311-0/3-540-94311-0 ------------------------------ Date: Sun, 19 Apr 1995 22:51:01 CDT From: CuD Moderators Subject: File 5--Cu Digest Header Info (unchanged since 19 Apr, 1995) Cu-Digest is a weekly electronic journal/newsletter. Subscriptions are available at no cost electronically. 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Authors hold a presumptive copyright, and they should be contacted for reprint permission. It is assumed that non-personal mail to the moderators may be reprinted unless otherwise specified. Readers are encouraged to submit reasoned articles relating to computer culture and communication. Articles are preferred to short responses. Please avoid quoting previous posts unless absolutely necessary. DISCLAIMER: The views represented herein do not necessarily represent the views of the moderators. Digest contributors assume all responsibility for ensuring that articles submitted do not violate copyright protections. ------------------------------ End of Computer Underground Digest #7.62 ************************************